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[6 posts]Tanner on Intersection and Intervention
If theology is to make a contribution to solving current capitalist economic problems, Professor Tanner writes in Chapter 3 of Economy of Grace, we must seek to identify what she calls the “relevant intersection and intervention.” The capitalist system contains features, principles, or gaps that are open to the insights and principles of theological economy - these areas are the potential points of intersection. Tanner thinks that the process of identifying the relevant intersections will reveal capitalism’s current configuration to be contingent and thus capable of alternative instantiations. Provided that we can identify the relevant intersections, theological economy can then intervene and redirect capitalism’s internal trajectory. Here in this chapter, Tanner pays particular attention to welfare and competition as areas of interaction and intervention between theological economy and capitalism.
Tanner posits that the theological principle of unconditional giving suggests welfare provision as a universal entitlement. Welfare should be unconditional and, “in keeping with a theological stress on a community of mutual fulfillment” be sufficient enough to enable people to fulfill their potential. Viewed in this way, capitalism can and should endorse the theological position on welfare since capitalism has a vested interest in increased productivity and flexibility of workers - things that Tanner thinks a welfare system based on the principle of unconditional giving would naturally promote.
Similarly, Tanner argues that theological economy and capitalism can converge with regards to competitiveness. Capitalism at present operates on a competitive win/loss logic - one that ultimately threatens the capitalist ideal of mutually beneficial equilibrium while encouraging mutually destructive economic spirals. The end result consists of decreased productivity of workers and a loss of profits for everyone. Tanner appeals to the theological principle of universal community that privileges a system of mutual beneficence. Such a focus would push capitalism towards lifting “conditions of ingrained systematic competitive disadvantage” that capitalism presently reinforces. She goes on to argue that we ought to prioritize investment in the real economies of developing countries while placing restrictions on financial markets since the latter are inherently competitive.
I think that Tanner is correct to argue for economic justification of welfare. There is a tendency to see the distribution of welfare benefits as exclusively coming from a humanitarian justification or motivation i.e., society cannot in good conscience allow members to starve even if they are unproductive, and thus must provide the destitute with some means of subsistence (usually the bare minimum). Such a focus misses the fact that welfare is also an economic investment in the recipient; welfare provides her with the material conditions necessary to develop into a productive member. As such, Tanner correctly argues that welfare must not consist solely of cash payments but must include provisions, such as health care and education, that foster "the realization of capabilities.” In this sense there is a clear convergence in theological and economic reasoning: both point to the importance of the person’s integral well-being and development.
That being said, I think there are internal tensions in Tanner’s account. In particular, the economic and theological principles adopted to justify welfare seem to make each other irrelevant. On the one hand, if one adopts the principle of unconditional giving as one’s motivation or justification for endorsing a robust welfare regime, then the economic or social usefulness of welfare necessarily becomes an irrelevant evaluative factor. After all, the principle consists in an injunction to give without condition, sensitive only to need. On the other hand, if one adopts the economic justification for welfare, the theological principle would be made unnecessary. It just makes so much economic sense to have welfare, one could say, such that appeals to theological reasons become superfluous.
Perhaps Tanner wants to say that there are two levels of justification or motivation such that if one falters the other one would still justify or motivate our support of welfare. For example, if strong empirical evidence shows that welfare is a disincentive to work, the theological principle of unconditional giving would still act as a reason against us cutting welfare. I doubt this response would work. If both reasons are valid they are valid at the same time; it’s not the case that principles function like tag-team wrestlers that switch in and out of the normative arena. If the failure of the economic principle means we have to fall back on the theological principle, then it was the theological principle that did the work of justifying or motivating the whole time i.e., the economic principle was never really relevant.
Perhaps Tanner can weaken her position and say that welfare can be justified or motivated from two independent reference points (the theological and the economic) though the reference points bear no internal connection with each other. That is, the two principles are relevant in relation to the object (welfare) that requires justification or motivation, but are irrelevant to each other. Such a response, however, would only undermine Tanner’s entire account since it would cast doubt on whether theological principles can meaningfully interact with and intervene in economic reasoning.
Comments
Benny argues that, while there seems to be a convergence of economic and theological principles in Tanner’s justification of welfare, these two principles stand in tension: they are either somewhat mutually exclusive, or acting independently like “tag-team wrestlers” that seek merely by their own internal logic (unrelated to one another) the same object. Either of these would undermine much of Tanner’s project of meaningful interaction between theological and economic reasoning.
In response to Benny’s criticisms, I think it might be helpful to assume, despite lack of explicit mention in the text we read, that these theological principles are the fundamentally regulating principles of Tanner’s account. If faith is, as Professor Volf has stressed in lectures, an overarching interpretation of reality that gives an account of what it means to flourish as a human being, and theology is the inner logic of faith, it is should be primary and economic reasoning subordinate. Such a broader vision also seems implicit, as noted in discussion today, in Tanner’s anthropology with respect to work, which stresses self-actualization in more of a Marxist tone than, for instance, Adam Smith’s underlying anthropology in which work is something merely endured to accrue certain goods and services.
With this in mind, the economic and social usefulness of a robust welfare system does not become irrelevant, for in order to give people with certain needs, certain goods must be exchanged. Someone can ascribe to theological principles onto which certain economic principles can be mapped in order to give certain goods to others. Different issues with respect to the distribution of goods must be addressed in order to give to those in need in different times. The theological principles can remain. Tanner is simply suggesting that this economic framework can be mapped-on to the theological principles today.
If strong empirical evidence shows that welfare is a disincentive to work, one returns to theological principles, and perhaps re-evaluates the economic principles one has adopted in order to better give to those in need. One might ask, “But shouldn’t welfare be maintained anyways, since those people are still in need?”
Where things get messy is that people are not simply loci for the exchange or reception of goods in a Christian anthropology. The goods maximized or distributed to people through economic exchange might, beyond goods of subsistence, be outweighed by the good of self-actualization in some sense. In this case, then, perhaps a robust welfare system would have to be revoked in order to “give” to the other more fully (just, for instance, as loving parents may withhold certain material privileges from a child for the sake of cultivating self-actualization through certain virtues). The theological principle, however, would still control. In Tanner’s piece, however, sound economic principles suggest that, both economically and in a more holistic sense, a Christian giving may be better achieved with a more robust welfare system.
I agree with you! To rephrase your general critique, the difficulty in Tanner’s attempt to meld together the theological and economic justifications is that the two can be either inconsistent or consistent, but then also superfluous. For example, Keynesianism as advocated by Tanner does not require a theological justification. And I think that the welfare debate is an ideal context to illustrate these tensions.
I would add to that a critique of Tanner’s frameworks of theology as well as economy: both of them are very specific and limited, and therefore not likely to appeal to those who don’t share her theology or her ideology.
First, the theological perspective is a very specific Christian one, and it is not entirely clear to me that it would necessarily be shared by a majority of Christians. For example, Tanner’s calls for unconditional welfare are inconsistent with the so-called “Protestant ethic” worldview and with Paul’s statement in his second epistle to the Thessalonians in the Bible: “He who does not work, neither should he eat.” (2 Thess 3). (In an interesting theological-ideological twist, this was later adopted by Lenin as a Soviet slogan condemning the idleness of the bourgeoisie.)
Second, I found that Tanner’s views on economy are much more ideologically-driven than economically-informed. To begin with, this is immediately evident from her terminology: the use of the phrase “global capitalism” is ideologically-charged, and most economists would opt for the more precise phrase “competitive market system.” Ideology aside, I also thought that the overall substantive presentation of economics was quite superficial in this discussion (bringing to mind some of my misgivings about the Occupy Wall Street movement). I am very interested in, and sympathetic to Tanner’s project of infusing global economics with theological meaning, but I would have liked to see much more of an economically-grounded discussion and a dialogue, perhaps one co-written by a theologian and an economist.
Benny’s criticism appears to me to be that Tanner is arguing for justification of an unconditional welfare system from both theological and capitalist economic values. I agree with Benny’s analysis that the two sets of economic principles, capitalist and theological, exist in a state of tension, in that they are independent of each other.
I do not, however, see this as a problem because I think that Tanner’s project is not to show that welfare is justified in both capitalist and theological economies, nor, as Adam Sims says that “Tanner is simply suggesting that this economic framework can be mapped-on the theological principles today.”
On page 98 she describes her project in this way:
“Given the fact that neither the burdens nor the benefits are shared, one can hardly say this is a system presently dedicated to meeting the needs of people everywhere and organized for the mutual benefit of all. The question is whether this is an intrinsic feature of global capitalism – perhaps even an intrinsic feature of capitalism period. Or whether the system might allow for – even work better (in its own terms) – were it to move in the directions a theological economy suggests.”
Tanner is not looking to justify specific policies by way of both capitalist and theological systems. She is argumentatively grounded in the theological economy’s values. She sees the current ‘global capitalism’ as functionally failing to effect the values of a theological economy (sorry Zorka, I also lack knowledge of the correct jargon). She is exploring the points of ‘intersection and intervention’ to see if capitalism is innately antithetical to the values of theological economy or if it may take another, still capitalist, form which can affect these values.
From this approach, it is to be an expectation, not a problem, that capitalist and theological arguments for welfare stand independent of each other.
Here’s the interesting thing about Tanner’s argument: while it does not conflate the two systems of justification, it uses the theological economy’s justification of unconditional welfare to assert that capitalism’s current form (one that is reducing benefits) is acting against its own capitalist values/interests as well as her theological ones. I think this is the sort of dialogue and influence Tanner is hoping from between her theological economy and contemporary economic systems.
I agree with Benny’s statement that Kathryn Tanner examines welfare from two viewpoints that constitute a motivation for establishing welfare provisions. First, the theological principle of unconditional giving and second, an economic reasoning of development through the “person’s integral wellbeing.” The theological principle of unconditional giving describes welfare as an action without a determining factor: “a universal entitlement, sensitive to the needy”(101). The economic motivation factor points out the fact that motivation and working capacity of employees increases when providing welfare in order to improve their living and working conditions. The increased working capacity leads to a mutual economic development and benefit. In this context, I understand Benny’s concern insofar as Kathryn Tanner’s two references point of motivation do not completely match. If Tanner submits an economic relevant reason – a better working capacity – as a motive of welfare provision, welfare can not be understood as “unconditional giving” (the theological principle) any longer.
In contrast to Benny’s opinion, I consider it as important to keep in mind Tanner’s basic goal on which the chapter is based. Tanner does not seek to bring theological and economic principles into perfect harmony since such a goal represents theological economy as a utopia. Tanner is fully aware that “making [welfare] conditional upon work is incompatible with the theological principle of unconditional giving“ (101) in its fundamental sense. Instead, the very essence of her approach aims to emphasize economical reference points on which theological principles can build in order to cause a change within the system; such a reference point constitutes welfare for the theological principle of unconditional giving. As a result a theological economy looses its character as complete utopia.
Although both the practical realization and the people’s will for change remains questionable, I think that Tanner offers hope for change by presenting a creative approach for a complex and difficult problem.
While it may seem that Tanner’s insistence upon providing both economic and theological justifications for her theological economy may seem superfluous, this is not necessarily the case. Ethics in the Anglo-American tradition has traditionally been divided into three parts: meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Thus, while two different ethics may look similar upon the applied level of ethics, where much of Tanner’s analysis operates, this similarity may be the result of very different principles upon the normative and meta-ethical levels. I would contend that the fact that Tanner’s proposals can be justified by an appeal to both her Christian theological principles and Keynesian economic principles is the result of just such a convergence on the applied level of ethics. In the same way, a socialist or Marxist could perhaps arrive at the same proposals that Tanner does, but she starts from a vastly different point than a theorist operating from one of these perspectives would.
This does not necessarily mean that theology is irrelevant to economy. What it does mean is that Tanner’s proposals have the potential to appeal to a large base, both within and outside the Christian church. This might seem surprising, but Tanner’s account throughout assumes a high theological anthropology. For her, the actors in a theological economy do not seem to be restricted to Christians, but to all humans who are capable of rational self-interest. This seems to me to be a strength of her proposals in our post-Christian, globalized society and world.
The previous comments focus chiefly on the tension between Tanner’s theological principles and her discussion of practical economic considerations, particularly with regard to welfare. Benny argues that, although she is correct to provide economic explanations for welfare in addition to a discussion of its relation to theological principles, her use of both forms of justification is problematic for one essentially becomes superfluous if the other is found convincing.
I agree that there is certainly a tension between theological principles and practical economic considerations that recurs throughout the chapter. Like Emily, however, I do not find this problematic. As the final portion of the chapter states, Tanner has a clear practical motivation in writing this text—she wishes to appeal to privileged American Christians to join the movement for justice globalism. Indeed, it is important to note that, while her principles are distinctive for their theological component, her economic policies are not particularly new or revolutionary. Most if not all are shared by various critics of current neoliberalism. Additionally, although we didn’t read the portion of her book in which she explains and textually justifies her choice of theological principles, most of them seem fairly clear as derivations from Christian values.
In spite of this, many Christians in the United States are very economically conservative. I see her project as an attempt to unite Christian principles with the practical and humanitarian concerns that drive most critiques of today’s capitalism. Her combination of both theological considerations and practical economic arguments is thus entirely consistent with this goal. The way that she weaves these principles ultimately serves to expand her audience and the utility of her work. I think that she recognizes that purely theological motives, such as unconditional giving, may not be enough to convince her audience to support welfare, for more short term personal concerns often outweigh abstract Christian beliefs that may be interpreted in many different ways. By naming the theological principles and then also providing more secular additional reasons for choosing these policies, she seeks (in my opinion successfully) to convince a wider group that her case is legitimate. Rather than undermining her argument, I believe that this strategy ultimately saves her project from mere theological abstractions and the “utopia” she seeks to avoid and demonstrates her understanding that even the most devout Christians have immediate economic concerns that need practical as well as theological solutions.
I agree that unconditional giving is important to providing a just society. Tanner's argument comes from a conviction that I share. The greatness of a society comes in how we love our neighbor, in how we treat the least of these. The theological premise of the argument reorients one's thinking to be mindful of the abundance that one has instead of what one doesn't have.
Capitalism as an economic principle and entity is designed as a mutually benefiting organism but has shown itself as a very adversarial system. The opportunity cost in this system is that there will be people who lose – economically, socially, even culturally.
Tanner's theological principle is one that is shared among faiths. In 1999, the ELCA issued a social statement about a sufficient, sustainable society. By sufficient, the Lutheran body 'means adequate access to income and other resources that enable people to meet their basic needs, including nutrition, clothing, housing, health care, personal development, and participation in community with dignity' (ELCA). Currently, the capitalist system in place does not take basic needs into consideration.
Tanner's principle of a theological economy also posits that the people on the ground will be responsible for making these changes, as the current system benefits those who are winning. The Social Statement from the ELCA also addresses this issue. “Local residents determine the future of their community by initiating, supporting, and sustaining new projects. Their capacities, skills, and assets help shape the vision and plan for the community” (ELCA)
In stretching this idea beyond the scope of Christians, I researched information regarding our Muslim brothers and sisters. According to Islamreligion.com, in an article about economic principles and justice:
As one can immediately surmise from these principles that the Islamic economic system is radically different from others, due to the difference of the values upon which it is based. In a capitalist society, one may see certain rules of economics which take precedence over moral and ethical values due to the intrinsic nature and values of that system. The same may be seen in communist, socialist and other societies as well. From the principles mentioned in these articles does the Islamic system of economics spring, striking balance between personal benefit and the benefit of society as a whole, as well as mundane profits and spiritual gains, all which ensure that one gain the Pleasure of the Lord of the Worlds. (italics mine)
I am also reminded of the housing first initiatives in Chicago, Denver, and Trenton. Having worked with this issue in Trenton, I am mindful of just minded persons looking at the situation from the bottom...what is it that those who live without housing need the most? What is better: conditions for earning a place in subsidized housing or providing a structure to first place a person in a home, to provide stability, and then to work with that person to help them with job training, health care, and education.
It just wasn't religious groups but various non-profit providers that saw a need to try something different that would make it easier, not harder, to obtain the goods and services needed to assist a person. Housing First becomes win/win. People who need their basic needs are met with dignity. Those participate in meeting those needs also win with their products and services being utilized.
The idea that the two economies are the same but different does not make sense. Weakening a position for the sake of win/win offers no incentive to make a change that supports the premise of either. The current economic system of quasi-laissez faire capitalism does not find it's equilibrium where supply meets demand. To meet the basic needs of all people, the people need to apply pressure on the system based on their convictions or faith. This is the intersection where a theological economy finds its strength.
I came across this interesting editorial in today's New York Times, and it seems to me this has some bearing on our debates: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/opinion/sunday/worldly-philosophers-wanted.html
Once I originally commented I clicked the -Notify me when new comments are added- checkbox and now every time a remark is added I get 4 emails with the same comment. Is there any approach you can take away me from that service? Thanks!
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