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[6 posts]Wolterstorff's Critique of Liberal Exclusion of Religious Principles in Public Debate: Ideologically Unsound or Just Inconvenient to Progressive Christians?
Wolterstoff’s paper centers around the question, “How should citizens espouse their religiously-based political views in the public space and act thereon?” and goes on to address what he claims are aggressive efforts by liberals to eliminate views with religious foundations from the public political sphere. He argues that as free and equal adults in a democratic society, that all should have the opportunity to espouse their beliefs and principles regardless of their foundations, as all foundations are equally unlikely to generate consensus on whether or not they are the offspring of legitimate public reason.
Wolterstoff questions the cogency of the requirement by liberalism that no religious beliefs have a home in political debate based on two principles, the first if we are truly to be considered equal and treated fairly, then there can be no restrictions on what can and cannot constitute one’s political principles. His other major critique of a system that only recognizes “reasonable” foundations for political principles is that when combining these guiding principles, no comprehensive vision for public reason is ever likely to emerge. Essentially, if the non-religious principles will never combine to establish public reason, why then must religion be excluded? He cites Rawls’ critique of liberalism that questions the principle underlying a limited scope of public reason when all important truths ought to be at the table, including religious ones. But while Rawls ultimately argues that religious principles can feed into the popular consensus, their religious dimensions must be ignored. Ultimately, the claim that all reasonable people would arrive at a single vision of justice from several reasonable principles is just as absurd as the claim that all
The instinct from a politically-oriented person of faith myself is to agree with Wolterstorff’s claim that their religious principles can and should play a role in political debate about public goods, both local and global. I am similarly critical of the claims by Rawls and others that we might ultimately arrive at consensus populi through shared reasonable principles. But what is more important than whether or not Wolterstorff is correct in the claim that religious principles have a right to inclusion in political debate is whether or not they are a value-add as such. Does the foundation from which a principle emerges ultimately matter if the end result is a public good? Are people of faith required by their faith to publicly proclaim not just the principle but that it is virtuous on account of its religious origins? Religious values are not just valuable because they are religious but because they are supposed to reflect a vision of the good. I recall the book of Matthew wherein those that pray in plain sight are rebuked for making such a show of their faith. Would not making a public display of the specifically religious reasons for political principles be similarly hypocritical?
Finally it is worth not that his argument is only attractive because he frames it around his religious convictions around the rights of the poor, an argument that favors adding rights rather than restricting them. However, since the writing of this article in 1993, we have seen a considerable uptick in the citing of religious reasons for political opinion and it has been primarily used to restrict rights rather than to liberate peoples and alleviate suffering. I wonder at the motivation of Christians with a more progressive political agenda that includes enfranchising the poor for wanting a public space for the religious roots of their principles. Is it because these foundations are particularly pertinent to public dialogue and or is it in the hope of rehabilitating the image of public Christianity as a faith of compassion and inclusion rather than condemnation and exclusion?
Comments
I appreciate Alana’s criticism of the idea that “we might ultimately arrive at consensus populi through shared reasonable principles.” Alana goes on to emphasize that what is actually important is whether or not religiously based principals add any value to political debate. She questions whether making a public display of the religious reasons for one’s principals could perhaps be the type of hypocrisy that Jesus warns against in the book of Matthew. Religion is supposed to reflect a vision of the good, so why do the religious origins matter?
In response to this, I would say that religious people (especially religious exclusivists) are often unable to theologically separate the principle from its founding ideology. And why should they be asked to do so? It doesn’t seem practical to me for the religious dimensions to be ignored, as Rawls suggests. Everyone has some sort of founding ideology behind his or her principles. Religious principles should all have equal voice in a liberal democracy. Alana points out that since Wolterstorff’s article, we have seen many politicians cite religious reasons to restrict individual rights. I think the answer to this use of religion in free society should be counter voices from progressive religious actors. If liberals don’t like the way that religion affects policy, then they too can use the same religious language in a different way. One of the problems in the United States is that conservative politicians speak about religion much more than liberals, so it seems that they have an exclusive claim on “God” language. In this sense, I agree with Alana that perhaps liberal Christians want to try to reform image of Christianity, and they should be free do so, just as conservatives do.
Alana outlines Wolterstorff’s critique of the liberal tendency to remove religious discourse from the public sphere. If individuals in a constitutional democracy are to be truly free and equal, with a premium put on the fair treatment of all individuals, then they should have every right to voice whatever opinions they want for whatever reasons they want. She correctly picks up on his rejection of Rawls’ position on account of the virtual impossibility of any kind of consensus populi emerging as a result of reasonable people unanimously agreeing to a reasonably presented argument. I agree with her in her approval of Wolterstorff’s position. However, to her wondering as to the value of religiously inspired public debate, I must claim that such value is irrelevant. Even were we to grant that there must be some value brought to the public sphere by the discourse of individuals, we get nowhere close to ascertaining what that value might be, given the pluralism in society- valuable to whom? By whose metric? Since an assessment of anything’s value is contingent upon a set of evaluative criteria which shifts from person to person (after all, as Wolterstorff points out, it would be as unlikely for a consensus on principles of justice, for example, to arise as a consensus on religious belief or some other meta-narrative). Finally, I disagree with the claim that Wolterstorff’s position is compelling simply because it speaks of expanding rights for the poor. Regardless of the outcome of religious discourse in politics, whether it be for good or for ill, his position is compelling because it values to freedom of all individuals to assert their own particular voice in the public square. While religious rhetoric may have led to some unfortunate consequences, the limiting of free speech would be far more tragic from a constitutional standpoint (which is the framework in which we’re working), and that, I believe, is the force of the argument.
Alana and Wolterstorf are both right in noting that prohibiting religiously-based speech in the public square unfairly deprives religious persons of their right to free speech. However, as Alana does admit, religiously-based speech has been used in the public square to bolster attempts to restrict the rights of some persons in American society. To this charge, one might object, as Wolterstorf does, that non-religious speech (namely fascism and communism) has also bolstered claims to restrict the rights of persons in secular states, and that the greatest atrocities of the twentieth century were motivated by secular –isms rather than religion. But the statement that secular speech can be as bad as religious speech does not excuse religious speech for being divisive or intolerant.
In American, religious speech has been used to bolster political efforts to oppose the African American civil rights movement, feminism and movements for the equality of women, and gay men, lesbians, and transgender persons. It is easy to see why some would like to see religious speech removed from the public square; it can be highly damaging. But, in each of these cases, secular reasoning was also used to support politicians’ opposition. Perhaps the answer is not to ban religious speech, but to work to rehabilitate both our religious and secular discourse. If we, as a nation, do “hold these truths to be self-evident,” then why are we working to restrict the rights of others? The problem is greater than our speech, it is a problem of our relation to our neighbors and fellow citizens, a question which religions are positioned to answer, for our good or for our ill.
In this post, Alana agrees with Wolterstorff’s argument against Rawls that people should be allowed to have public political views that are motivated by faith, but she implies that she does not believe that the distinctively religious reasons for those views should enter the political conversation. I agree with the idea that religious motivations should be able to influence one’s public political life, but I think that religious motivations are necessary for that discourse. Alana posits some notion of the “good” that seems rather close to being self-evident. This reasoning seems to suggest that political views will be evaluated on the basis of their conformity to the good, regardless of their motivating ideology. I do not believe that such a vision of the good is actually so self-evident. Rather, one’s grounding assumptions can lead to differing concepts of the good. Even if one concedes something seemingly as basic as the claim that the good is to strive to allow all individuals to flourish, various comprehensive positions will give differing interpretations of flourishing (e.g., is flourishing the maximization of pleasure, or is it living the virtuous life, even if it brings greater suffering?). For effective public discourse, it would seem that making clear one’s general understanding of the good is necessary for others to adjudicate the validity of the particulars for which one is striving. In this way it seems that it is necessary that people disclose the motivating forces behind public political discourse, whether they be religious or otherwise.
I wanted to comment on Alana’s point that Wolterstroff’s “argument is only attractive because he frames it around his religious convictions around the rights of the poor, an argument that favors adding rights rather than restricting them.” I have to completely agree with Alana on this point and want to expand upon it.
I think Alana is correct when she continues by pointing out that recently Christianity has been used to restrict more rights that protect. Before this article was written and in today’s current political atmosphere it is seems that if there is a line between the church and state it is very blurry.
From the Moral Majority’s “I Love America” tour promoting Christian social values, to the Tea Party’s anti-Islamic rhetoric, or even the Mormon Church having a significant financial impact on the restriction of marriage to same sex couples in California the influence of Religion on the state is undeniable.
Wolterstroff believes that it is, “definitive of liberalism, as I shall be taking it, to embrace a certain view as to the proper basis of public political debate, and of political decision making, in a society which incorporates a diversity of religion.” (Wolterstroff, 166). However, as he confirms there has not been an incorporation of a diverse grouping of religious beliefs. Where religion has been at play in the conversation it has been almost all Christian.
He goes on to question the outdated view liberalism holds against religion. I think it is interesting that he notes while many of the 17th Century wars may have been fought over religion that many of the struggles today have been fought over secular issues.
On the contrary it is important to also see the good of Religious discourse in political social action as well. Wolterstroff points out that some of the greatest leaps forward today have included religion at their core including, “the abolitionist movement in nineteenth-century America, the civil rights movement in twentieth-century America, the resistance movements in fascist Germany, in communist Eastern Europe, and in apartheid South Africa.” (Wolterstroff, 167).
As a Christian that has often struggled with the role of religion in politics I find balance in Wolterstroff’s conclusion when he advocates for the voices of all the citizens, of many religious beliefs or those with none saying, “why not let people say what they want, but insist that they say it with civility?” (Wolterstroff, 180). It feels like being treated as equal means the right to fully and truthfully voice ones opinions, beliefs, and convictions. It should be only after one has fully partaken in the political discourse and partaken in ones right to vote that the pending legislation should be, “sufficient if it be the fairly-gained and fairly executed agreement of the majority of us.” (Wolterstroff, 181).
Alana sympathizes more with Wolterstorff’s argument concerning faith in the public sphere than with Rawls’. This seemed to be the general trend in section this week with students. While I, too, identify more with Wolterstorff, I think we tend to simplify and exaggerate Rawls’ claim against religion’s role in the public discourse. Wolterstorff and Rawls do not operate at opposite extremes. Rather, I think of Rawls as a logical, yet ultimately mistaken, extension of Wolterstorff. Rawls envisions the existence of a consensus on the principles of justice, whereas Wolterstorff rejects that claim, and thus, the premise of Rawls’ issue with religion as legitimate reason. But while people should be free to believe solely based on Biblical or Koranical roots, there need to exist secular reasons in order for the government to endorse such a view. Otherwise, the Constitution would be violated.
Alana writes, “Does the foundation from which a principle emerges ultimately matter if the end result is a public good? Are people of faith required by their faith to publicly proclaim not just the principle but that it is virtuous on account of its religious origins?” Although she writes that she agrees more with Wolterstorff, here Alana implicitly agrees with Rawls. If the end result is good, then religion shouldn’t be necessary to justify a belief. But where Rawls crosses the line is in rejecting the right for religious people to voice their ideas from a position of faith. He rightly states, though, the need for a reason other than religious roots to be present in order for a belief to be endorsed by the government and become law. If there is not, then how could the government be seen as treating religions “impartially” (Wolterstorff, 165)?
Thus, religion, like Rawls states, needn’t be necessary to justify action in the public sphere, but its reference should not be silenced in the public sphere, as Wolterstorff contends. People have the right to religion as the basis for their personal reason. Here, I agree with Wolterstorff. The government, however, does not. Here I agree with Rawls. Therefore, by virtue of how our constitutional democracy operates, all religious beliefs that contribute to the societal good will have reason outside of religion to be supported by that good while not infringing on people's rights to believe based solely on their religion.
The blogger, a person of faith, believes that religious principals can and should play a role in the political sphere. The blogger disagrees with Rawls’ idea that common rational principles may ultimately generate a consensus populi. The blogger also believes that religious values are especially useful because they reflect a vision of good. The blogger asks the question as to whether the foundation (i.e. faith) from which a principle emerges ultimately matters if the end result is a public good. I would argue no. I cannot see how anyone would be opposed to something that is created from neutral to positive means and has positive ends. The blogger also wonders whether people of faith are required by their faiths to publicly proclaim not just their views, but that that their views are virtuous on account of those views’ religious origins? I would argue that such a requirement is dependent upon one’s individual religion. It seems to me that Jehovah’s Witnesses probably would have such a requirement; wherefore, some other religions (such as Catholicism) may not. The blogger points to a biblical story where (if I recall the story correctly), Jesus rebukes the Pharisees for showing off how religious they are when, in fact, the Pharisees are not really living Christ’s message. This lends credence to the idea that Christians do not have to proclaim that their faith is the rational for their actions. The blogger also questions whether telling others that one is acting in accordance with their religious beliefs in the political sphere is an action that should be rebuked by God for showing off how religious that person is when, in fact, such boasting is not the best way to really live Christ’s message. I think the answer to this depends. Is one proclaiming that they are acting this way to make themselves to look better and gain notoriety as a religious person? Or, is the person proclaiming that God’s message has inspired them to act this way so as to spread God’s message to others so that those others can be inspired to act in a similar way and to help those others reach eternal salvation?
While there are points made by Alana that I agree with, I think that Jacob makes an astute observation of her reasoning. By downplaying the origins of the principle in favor of its grounding within the public’s sense of “good”, the religious origins are left unimportant relative to some universal sense of justice and social good. This is why, albeit unpopular amongst most students in the class, I find Rawls’ idealization of public discourse to at least be interesting, if not slightly compelling.
I do agree with Myle’s assessment of the importance of free speech, I believe that the question is not so much whether people should be allowed to base their socio-political beliefs on religious origins, but whether doing so is useful to the broad debate. Assuming we are working within a religiously pluralistic democratic society, discourse in the public arena is not just amongst those in the Christian community, but amongst a diverse set of faiths. In framing arguments in favor of specific policy or legislation, Bible verse is not sufficient in addressing why a community should undergo some change in their lifestyle. There must be something at the core of any public policy that can speak to people of any faith or of no faith; I believe this is at least one valid idea that can be teased out of the Rawls’ piece. While people are certainly left to believe and speak their mind to the extent to which free speech protects, the quality of those arguments are what is at question. If a person motivated by Christian belief cannot find a single non-scripture motivation for a particular perspective, how could such an idea find acceptance amongst the population at large? I do not think that it is disingenuous to at least offer secular reasoning in addition to religiously motivated opinions (or vice versa); instead I think it serves to broaden the appeal and legitimacy of an idea.
In her thoughtful analysis, Alana engages with Wolsterstorff’s critique of liberals’ supposed insistence on excluding religious principles and beliefs from public debates. Although Wolsterstorff professes his desire to be fair to liberalism, I believe that he misreads Rawls and other liberals to the extent that the liberal prohibition is not on religiously-based views but rather on religiously-expressed views. John Kerry alluded to this distinction in his presentation this week when he said that we cannot expect political figures to leave their religious faith behind, but that in America, there is an implicit expectation to frame it differently in the public sphere. The distinction flows from America’s constitutional principles, as Jacob pointed out in his comment above. Taking up Alana’s excellent question of what value religious principles can add, I think that the value has to be in the eyes of each beholder/believer, in providing independent legitimization for policies (as in the Rawlsian idea of the overlapping consensus that we discussed earlier). To explain what I mean by this, let’s take Wolsterstorff’s example of poverty: his view, that involuntary avoidable poverty is a violation of the rights of the poor, is clearly religiously-based in his individual case, but as he admits, such view is by no means exclusive to Christianity and is widely shared among various religious and indeed by secular atheists. Rather than framing this principle as a Christian one per se, a better advocacy strategy would frame it in more universal terms, citing multiple sources of religious and secular justifications that can appeal to different audiences.
The blogger, Alana aligns herself with Wolterstorff’s views on faith in the public domain as opposed to Rawls’ in her blog posting. While I agree with certain portions of the views presented, I see Rawls’ views on the public domain much more realistic. As cited by blog responders above, I believe that some of Rawls’ views may have been over simplified and in some cases misunderstood. The portion where he centrally defines his standpoint stands testimony to this- “It is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason does not apply to all political discussions of fundamental questions, but only to discussions of those questions in what I refer to as the public political forum. This forum may be divided into three parts: the discourse of judges in their decisions... the discourse of government officials... and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially in their public oratory, party platforms, and political statements.” In my opinion, Rawls critique is strictly one that states that secularism and religion cannot be used as reasons for decisions made in the public sphere is sound. In the diverse society that we live in, it would not be fair, to attribute or go as far as superimposing one’s motivations behind a particular decision (one that affects the public domain), to religion or secularism. While free speech is an important characteristic for the world to know and practice, it should be done in a way where one does not attribute its source to religion. While the end result from differing ideologies might be the same, one side attributing the causality to a specific religion or thought might antagonize the other sides(s) on the long run. Growing up in a secular nation, I have always looked at the world as one that has increasingly become pluralistic and in some cases secular. Despite redundant citations of pluralism and secularism in media and life, one of the things that I have seen in my country (also evidenced in the reading ‘India after Gandhi’), people use religious bias as a reason to overturn governments. Having seen this happen for over 20 years in my life, my belief is biased towards a train of thought, where I believe that, non-attribution of religion in the public sphere helps people gain clarity in their decisions- towards their choice of their governing leaders.
At the end of her post, Alana states: “I wonder at the motivation of Christians with a more progressive political agenda that includes enfranchising the poor for wanting a public space for the religious roots of their principles. Is it because these foundations are particularly pertinent to public dialogue and or is it in the hope of rehabilitating the image of public Christianity as a faith of compassion and inclusion rather than condemnation and exclusion?”
I love this question, and as someone who would claim to be a progressive Christian I think it is essential to honestly attempt to answer it. The question is absolutely valid because we as Christians in politics throughout history have tainted the faith with our stance on countless issues from slavery to the Civil Rights movement. Naturally, knowing that my faith is rooted in the love and reconciliation Christ promises to bring to all people, from the disenfranchised of sub-Saharan African to millionaires on Wall Street, I would love nothing more than to show people that the global church is radically different from how it is so often perceived. But our goal as Christians in public policy can never be to simply change people’s view of Christianity as a religion of, “condemnation and hostility”. No, I would hope that as Christians we would use our desire for realized reconciliation to engage in today’s globalized world where it is relevant to public debate, could evoke change, and bring justice. It would be my hope that through Christians’ tireless efforts working side by side people with whatever ideological conviction drives them to care about the world’s poor that our work towards alleviating suffering would speak for itself about the nature of today’s progressive Christians.
Alana makes a good point when she states that religion is often used to restrict rights and that this occurrence can be seen more and more in recent years. However, instead of using this as an excuse to push values with purely religious foundations out of the public sphere, as so many often advocate doing, I want to suggest that this phenomenon provides all the more reason to dialogue in a politico-theological manner.
As Canon Andrew White, an interfaith advocate based in Baghdad believes, if religion is part of the problem it must be part of the solution as well. Faith provides a fundamental framework for many and it is impossible to totally disregard the differences that spark such animated debate in the public sphere in order for successful communication to occur. Instead, recognizing the filters through which others interpret their societies is often one of the most important steps in having a rewarding political conversation. It is in this attitude that one is able to see the humanity of his or her political adversary, as opposed to watering down the fundamental personhood of both in order to come to some sort of theoretical neutral ground. Widespread political decisions made in this purgatory of sorts often do not address reality in an effective manner.
Thus it is not only convenient for Christians (and those of other faiths) to use religious principles in public debate, it becomes a necessary practice. I grant that this practice is often used by the most outspoken of the evangelical political bloc as a way to pursue their pet issues yet this too becomes an impetus for the layman to faithfully engage in public debate as we seek cross-cultural, cross-party, and interfaith cooperation.
Alana raises an excellent point by calling into question the motivations behind bringing faith into political discussion. Her questions regarding hypocrisy and religious platform-seeking are valid, but her critique seems to lack recognition of the truth that, for people of faith, religion and theology occupy much of the lens through which they view and interpret the world. Julia, who commented above, stated well that we ought to recognize the "filters through which others interpret their societies [as] one of the most important steps in having a rewarding political conversation." I would like to add here that just as we seek to recognize the filters of others, we ought to name our own. In doing this, we need not reje or suppress our values, but rather express them more fully with an understanding of their impact on the way we interact with and interpret society.
Naming our lenses does not invalidate our political claims or conversations, as many who advocate for the exclusion of religion from public conversation might argue. Rather, in this act of naming [religious] values we demonstrate an understanding of ourselves as culture and value-driven individuals with agency, something that can only strengthen political dialogue. It is, in fact, through this process that we deepen in understanding the connection between ourselves and our adversaries -- that is to say, we come to recognize that as culturally and societally-embedded humans, we are indeed shaped and driven by our values -- religious or otherwise.
A final note: these values ought not be considered inescapable; rather, in naming them, we gain the agency to mold and redefine them as they mold and define us and the lenses through which we perceive the world.
I agree with Kait in that the lens through which we view the political sphere is one that should be expressed. However, I want to push this a step further. Yes, we must realize that we all view life through slightly or vastly different lenses, but we must be receptive to the differences. In doing so, in providing a listening ear and an open mind, respect is given to the individual and value is intrinsic. If we are to seek the common good in a globalized world we must be willing to listen to the stance of others. Recently on The Stone forum, there was posted a commentary, "Should Religion Play a Role in Politics?" One stance Gary Gutting posed was essentially that religion is private and politics are public. Therefore, religion has no place in politics at all. How can those whose actions are significantly influenced by religious beliefs not speak of them? More importantly, how can they be separated? I do not claim unbearable hurt has not resulted by explicating religious reasoning in the political sphere, but I do think that the extremes must be mediated. Open minds must seek understanding in order to pursue the common good, and a civil and dignifying converstion must be at the heart of how we press forward.